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The Ethical Dimension of Human Nature
A New Realist Theory
Gitie House, Australia
Ron House, University of Southern Queensland, Australia
Abstract: The interaction amongst individuals and their emergence in larger human organisations such as a community or
a state are intimately bound to the reality of the human being. Thus, individuals do not exist simply as servants of a collective,
but on the other hand, one cannot delude oneself into thinking that one lives in a private reality. To take the most basic
point, all sentient beings feel pleasure and pain. This is not optional or negotiable and is not just a social construction or
a product of an ideology. It follows from the simple fact that sentient beings must take action to avoid harm or promote
benefit. The further particular properties of the nature of any particular species of sentient being such as humans are sim-
ilarly mandated by the situation of that species within the total bio-sphere. Again, this is not optional. However, the human
species has a flexible mind and a language capable of communicating subtle or abstract thoughts. As a consequence, humans
can ask that basic question of how to promote benefit and avoid harm on a level and with a depth that is revolutionary in
terms of existence on this planet. This is the genesis of ethics and morality and it follows from the fundamental nature of
our reality. This revolutionary new capacity must not be squandered by denying the objective and universal nature of the
ethical discussion undertaken by individuals, groups and societies. To a unique extent, human goods are frequently intangible;
this is the primary source of all human studies: economics, history, literature, law, ethics, and so on. Their intangibility
should not mislead us into thinking that they are infinitely malleable according to our whims and preferences. A theory of
economics or a law may be workable or otherwise in just the same way as a tangible good such as an electric motor. For
this reason, the humanities have legitimate claims as fields of science and engineering. But they must not betray the respons-
ibility that comes with this realisation by departing from the spirit of the scientific enterprise, which has as its foundation
accountability to the truths about universal reality. In this analysis, ethics is the realm that connects individual human
nature to societal realities such as laws. It does so in various conceptual dimensions. In the domain of willed action it re-
cognises that human beings are neither infallible nor omniscient, and therefore cannot give effect to all their plans; and so,
there must be a realm of unenforced obligation between what is compulsory (law) and what is completely free (personal
preferences). In the realm of planning and understanding, ethics is the connective between the realities of individual human
nature and those of social organisation. These are processes of mutual influence and feedback determined by reality,
whether we understand that reality or not. But if it is understood, or understood better than before, new possibilities are
opened for positively influencing human social and individual evolution. The Principle of Goodness is a new realist ethical
theory which acknowledges these truths about human nature and the vast web of interactions within which humans live and
exercise their wills. It has a great deal to say about how people should act, and in turn be treated by others. It shows that
contemporary socio-political theory is wholly inadequate as a suitable basis for human flourishing: in particular, the
fashionable compulsion to reduce the variegated uniqueness of each of the six billion human individuals to generalised
properties based upon categories within which they are placed, such as race, class, and gender. Not one of these categories
stands up to a critical analysis of its usefulness as a means of dividing people from each other. The result is that many
people are treated unjustly, the consequences to their lives disregarded; and yet the ideal society eludes us - as it must because
these categories are not grounded in reality. In this paper we focus on the human individual. We investigate how the trust
and sense of security that follows from treating every single one ethically as individuals will be conducive to the development
of positive feedback cycles of care, concern, friendship, and compassion throughout the matrix of human interaction. The
challenge, then, for those who desire a world free of inequity, conflict and insecurity is to re-examine every social field in-
formed by this ethics, which is grounded in the inescapable reality of the human condition.
Keywords: Principle of Goodness, Ethics, Science and Humanity, Origin of Ethics
Introduction
WE EXPLORE SOME basic propertiesof the Principle of Goodness, an ethicaltheory discovered by the authors. (We
say “discovered”, as its insights long
predate our notice of them, and underlie manymajor
religious and ethical schools of thought; but they
have been assumed, or ‘intuited’, rather than put into
an explicit formula. See [House 2005].) The theory
may be termed ‘process-realist’, meaning that the
terms “Good” and “evil” in the statement of the the-
ory are claimed to be realities: not of matter or other
substance, but of consistent patterns within processes
involvingmoral actors. This conception is not unusu-
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al; for example, the reality of money is not found in
any physical property of a particular note or coin,
but in the way in which money participates in pro-
cesses such as buying or selling. We expect that in-
vestigations of processes will yield fruit in under-
standing ethics. A good deed is not an object, but a
characterisation of properties of a story, a history, a
process, in which moral actors operate.
The problem of ethics is to understand this reality
better, not to somehow persuade people to “be good”.
Surveys of how people would like the world to be
typically find that altruistic answers dominate the
rest, such as: a world at peace; equity and justice; no
prejudice; no more hungry, sick, illiterate or poor;
safety; the opportunity to lead happy lives; freedom
to pursue opportunities for creativity and prosperity;
opportunities to assist others in fields such as health,
education, economics, arts, music, human understand-
ing, etc. (Example: [MORI 1999].) Nevertheless,
opinion has sometimes been strongly in favour of
destructive policies, such as war (for example, at the
time for the crusades). Clearly, two tendencies are
operative in human beings, and it is reasonable to
posit that either of these could be enhanced in a cycle
of positive reinforcement. To take the destructive
example, had victory and prosperity followed from
the crusades, we might reasonably expect that even
greater public support for those policies would have
followed. Can sound ethics improve our choices?
Although here we can do little more than investigate
likelihoods and show some connections, we can ad-
vance the Principle of Goodness in the sense of a
scientific hypotheses, making particular predictions
about interactions of ethical and practical processes.
Ethical investigations of such nature are not new,
so it makes sense to draw some parallels with other
major ethical philosophies and theories.
Situation of Personal Ethics
Personal ethics structures the realm between com-
plete freedom and laws. Not everything that is per-
missible is admirable or wise. Individuals reasonably
ask for greater guidance than the content of the na-
tion’s statute books, whether as unspoken social
mores or as explicit principles. Much disagreement
exists as to how, or even if, this should be done (for
example political and religious ideologies, group
opinion, other ethical systems such as utilitarianism,
Kantian ethics, practical reasonableness, virtue ethics,
and so on). By highlighting some likely con-
sequences of widespread choice of the Principle of
Goodness as a social and personal guide, we hope
to provide reasons for its practicability. However,
the choice of an ethics to live by is not necessarily
an either-or proposition, and interconnections
amongst ethical theories can strengthen the justifica-
tion for ‘believing in’ ethics itself as a genuine sub-
ject for investigation rather than as a widespread
(“Nietzschean”) mistake.
The Principle of Goodness
A brief statement of this principle is that:
Goodness is to attempt to benefit everyone;
evil is to attempt to harm any innocent one.
This does not refer to non-ethical meanings of these
words, such as profit, welfare, or fortune, although
connections with these other meanings are obvious.
Indeed, non-ethical meanings provide content for
the terms “benefit” and “harm” in the above. We
might say that (moral) good is to try to provide
(practical) good to everyone. Nevertheless, the
meanings are distinct, and the Principle is not a
statement about outcomes, but refers to mental states,
that is, not merely wishing, or even intending, but
actually attempting, to promote the welfare of all (in
the case of goodness) or to harm any innocent (in
the case of evil). Attempts might not be actions: re-
fraining from a harmful course might be part of an
intention to promote benefit, or refraining from a
saving action might be part of an attempt to cause
harm.
Although we do not evaluate an ethical act by its
outcome, nevertheless the actor’s knowledge and
capacities that led to a given outcome are themselves
the products of other, prior acts, such as whether the
person bothered to collect relevant information, or
obtain equipment that was clearly needed for perform-
ing a certain task. In this sense, practical failure to
achieve benefit or avoid harm might indeed be re-
garded as ethical failure, but only because other, en-
abling, attempts were not themselves conducted to
the best of the actor’s abilities. This is why, for ex-
ample, we often excuse children for some acts that
are held culpable in adults, even though in both cases
the right action might have been impossible due to
lack of knowledge. ([Hursthouse])
This is not a consequentialist theory such as utilit-
arianism. But when we talk of mental states rather
than outcomes, a utilitarian might respond that he,
too, accepts that in a real situation, one can do noth-
ing else than attempt to produce the overall maxim-
um happiness, and should not be condemned for
factors outside one’s control. An example might
clarify the distinction. Suppose a villain threatens
that, unless I murder Jane, he will murder all of
Jane’s family, Jane included; and suppose that there
is no ‘way out’ of our dilemma by foiling the villain
somehow, and there are no ‘long term’ counterbalan-
cing consequences such as are often posited by util-
itarian analyses to change the obvious ‘right choice’
under that theory. A consequentialist would probably
have to agree that I should kill Jane, as that leads to
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the least damaging overall outcome. (Utilitarian
counter-arguments to such scenarios are considered
by [Finnis], and disposed of successfully, in our
opinion.)
Under the Principle of Goodness, however, no
such conclusion follows, even though not doing as
the villain demands results in a worse or equally bad
outcome for every single person involved. I might
or might not believe that to kill Jane in these circum-
stances is to attempt to harm Jane. (I might not be-
lieve it if I regard my actions as being completely
determined by the greater threat.) And if I do not kill
Jane, then, knowing what I do about the villain’s in-
tentions, I might or might not believe that refraining
from killing Jane is to attempt to kill her entire fam-
ily, Jane included. If I believe the former but not the
latter, then I must not kill Jane! - even if I know full
well that all Jane’s family will die. On the other hand,
if I believe that both actions will harm, but that
neither is an attempt by me to harm, then I have no
choice available that does no harm. I have failed to
find a non-harming behaviour. Something will hap-
pen based on what I do next, and I might even resort
to counting numbers to decide what that something
is. If I kill Jane to avoid her family’s deaths, I have
failed, but have not deliberately chosen evil. But I
still cannot argue that killing Jane was the ‘right’
thing to do; it is failing ethically, even if that failure
might be excusable. There is another similar scenario
that makes the difference more stark. Suppose that,
instead of threatening to kill Jane’s family, the villain
threatens to kill Bill’s family. Now the numbers do
not count; Jane’s death, if I accede to the villain, will
be of my choosing, whereas Bill’s family’s deaths
will not be. Choosing Jane’s death is to do evil, and
I should not attempt to rationalise anything else. Now
Socrates’ point is unavoidable: evil might be done,
but it should not be done through me! Of course, in
reality, where we can’t assume that the villain will
certainly carry out any threat, no one’s death is cer-
tain and that reinforces the reason to refuse to kill
Jane in either scenario. This key difference between
consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories
is discussed at length by [Finnis].
Finally, in large measure we have been trained in
our society to measure things by their effects, so we
must beware of judging an ethic by outcome alone,
which is the definition of one particular ethical fam-
ily (consequentialism) and is almost to grant the
victory to some ethic from that group at the outset.
When choosing an ethic, therefore, we must be pre-
pared to allow even our method of judgement to be
informed by considerations from all contending the-
ories.
Relationships amongst Ethical Theories
Based on what an ethical theory is trying to achieve,
we might distinguish at least three kinds of theories
(not intending to be exhaustive):
1. theories that define one or more key ethical
terms and deduce ethical behaviours from them,
or claim to have found the basis for ethics
somewhere (Hume’s ‘passions’, utilitarianism,
Kantian ethics), or alternatively deny the possib-
ility of doing so (Nietzschean denial of ethics);
2. scientific theories (areas in cognitive science,
neuroscience, behavioural genetics, evolution-
ary biology, and evolutionary psychology),
which explain the causes of ethical behaviour,
such as being selected for by evolution as the
behaviour of beings most likely to reproduce
and pass on tendencies for similar behaviour to
offspring;
3. theories that do not necessarily advance some
foundational source of ethics, but rather appeal
for credence to the suitability of the entire sys-
tem to achieve its goals, such as ‘the good life’
(Confucianism; Aristotelian ethics, and in par-
ticular [MacIntyre]’s modern redevelopment
and adaptation of it).
Each category contains divergent ethical theories,
so this does not classify theories by similarity of their
recommendations. Indeed, category (b) refers to
theories without recommendations (in the theories
themselves, although some scholars might write
moral commentary on such a basis).
At first sight, the Principle of Goodness seems to
fall in category (a), as it sets out a statement of ethical
terms, and promises to derive other things such as
rules of behaviour from these. However, it is a realist
theory. It asserts that the statements of the theory are
chosen in the hope that they accord with certain
realities, consistencies and patterns, that can be un-
derstood as moral, such as kindness, care, love, and
compassion, in human individuals, and justice, fra-
ternity, friendship, and social concern in societies.
That is, the hypothesis is that following the Principle
produces or tends to produce, individuals and societ-
ies of such natures. In other words, it is also a theory
related to those in category (b). But can we argue
every decision from the basics for every judgement
we, or society might make? Derivation of secondary
ethical principles, such as honesty and other virtues,
seems to be necessary, implying that activity belong-
ing in category (c) will need to be undertaken as part
of elaborating a practical moral understanding.
We thus see that these categories are not mutually
exclusive: more than one ethical theory can be “in
the right” in some sense, for reasons other than those
considered by [Smith], who addresses only the nature
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of virtue and the contents of praiseworthy character
(Part VI section I). It may even be that some theories
in different categories might be closely related or
lend each other support, but this might not be obvious
due to the different ways in which theories in these
different categories are explicated. For example,
consider theories in categories (b) and (c): if human
behaviour is moulded to some degree by instinctive
determinants, then we would expect that a well-de-
veloped ethical systemmight knowingly or unknow-
ingly take these into account somehow.
Category (a) seems to be the odd one out. The
reason is that it appears to favour a deductivist ap-
proach, establishing core principle(s), then deducing
everything from there. Since Hume, it has been hard
to argue for any but a deductive approach to any
question. (Witness the wide belief in [Popper]’s
theory of scientific falsifiability, an explicit accept-
ance of Hume’s idea.) But this need not imply deduct-
ivism: for example, utilitarianism is often argued
from an appeal to judge the intuitive rightness of its
foundational principle, not from any necessary reason
that it should be true. Further, we have [Frederick L.
Will]’s two books that lay a solid groundwork for
justifying and understanding truth in other than strict
deductivist terms. So, even with a foundational
principle, we can look at the totality of a theory and
evaluate it as a whole, including its assumptions,
consequences, internal logic, and external evidence.
Now category (a) is starting to resemble (b) and (c).
A grounding assumption such as our Principle might
act as the starting point for deduction without imply-
ing a belief in solely deductive reasons for accepting
conclusions, or, indeed, the entire enterprise. As
powerful confirmation (the word is used advisedly)
of this, wemay point to [Stove]’s meticulous analysis
and criticism of Hume’s inductive scepticism.
Composing a Synthesis
At the start of his book on a revised Aristotelian
virtue ethics, [MacIntyre] claims that there has been
a degeneration in understanding ethics; over the past
few centuries, broken theories have replaced an
earlier, sounder, ethics. (“We possess indeed simu-
lacra of morality, we continue to use many of the
key expressions. But we have - very largely, if not
entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical
and practical, of morality.” (p2)) Certainly the case
for current theories being disordered is plausible:
MacIntyre argues that the combination of Kant
(denying non-rational bases for morality), Hume
(denying reasons not based on the passions), and
Kierkegaard (insisting on criterionless fundamental
choice) effectively removes any reasonable way to
defend morality as understood in modernity (p49).
He holds that the only rational alternatives are either
the Nietzschean diagnosis or relinquishing the entire
“Enlightenment project” (p118). Be that as it may,
MacIntyre clearly fails in establishing the other part
of his thesis, that Aristotelian ethics is the forgotten
sounder theory that the modern world retains only
in fragmentary, semi-understood forms. He is affron-
ted that Aristotle took what he regards as the clearly
mistaken course of “writing off” “non-Greeks, bar-
barians, and slaves” (pp 158,159). But in what sense
can Aristotle’s ethics be better than that of even the
most untutored modern, if his system cannot warn
him of the wrongness of excludingmembers of these
groups?
Perhaps Aristotle overlooked some aspect of his
own system that should have warned him, but if so,
MacIntyre doesn’t tell us, apart from an inconclusive
mention of Aristotle’s failure to appreciate the im-
portance of historical factors. MacIntyre has made
important clarifications to Aristotelian ethics with
his explication of “practices” and the distinction
between reasons that are internal and external to
these practices, and understanding virtues in this
context. (“A virtue is an acquired human quality the
possession and exercise of which tends to enable us
to achieve those goods which are internal to prac-
tices and the lack of which effectively prevent us from
achieving any such goods.”) From this basis, he is
able to show that the system does indeed ‘hang to-
gether’. But even so, MacIntyre does not, and appar-
ently can not, tell us what Aristotle could have or
should have understood about virtue to be warned
about the evils of slavery. If we need to appeal to
our existing intuitive feelings to recognise such a
huge evil, it is hard to see why such theories should
be regarded as complete ethical systems. ([Miller]
raises one possibility, Aristotle’s distinction between
unjust and just governments, the latter aiming at the
common advantage. But the facility with which he
introduces distinctions that reduce or remove consid-
eration from slaves, women, etc., shows that nothing
in his ethics protects this principle from undermin-
ing.)
We propose that the Principle of Goodness
provides the ‘bottom layer’ underlying any sound
ethical system. Starting with the Principle, we may
deduce or infer other ethical rules, such as principles
of honesty, fair dealing, generosity, kindness, and
so on. Or we could start at the other end, performing
an analysis of virtue in MacIntyre’s style and devel-
oping a system. These projects can meet when the
Principle is used to inform the system, to give it pegs
to hang upon, and thus prevent it lapsing into ethic-
ally bad judgements, such as permitting slavery. The
reason the Principle prohibits slavery is so obvious
we can dispense with wasting words on it here, but
more subtle questions can be addressed. For example,
we may employ such considerations to analyse Aris-
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES, VOLUME 3
totle’s discussion (Nichomachean Ethics Book III,
1.) of particular kinds of ignorance (universal and
particular) and their culpability. That is, when Aris-
totle says we are excused for ignorance of particulars
but not universals, we may argue that the reason is
that in dealing with particulars, the chain of moral
attempts that led to the situation under discussion
was short, or consisted of only the moral act in
question. But in the case of universals, ignorance of
them was the product of morally faulty attempts
during much of one’s life, leading eventually to one’s
ignorance and incapability to act for the best at the
crucial time.
We thus see virtues in general as summaries of
ethical complexities that could in principle be ‘taken
apart’ and explained in terms of ‘moral building
blocks’, the myriad occasions, great and small, dur-
ing a lifetime, in which one had to choose how to
act, whether for goodness, for evil, or for neither
(noting that our statements of good and evil do not
together cover all possible willed attempts). In this
sense the Principle of Goodness is a different kind
of rationale for the virtues than that employed by
Aristotle, which is essentially utilitarian (enlightened
happiness). This fact is two-sided. On the one hand,
it holds out the hope that the Principle of Goodness
(if it is a good ethical theory) is more consistently
reliable than principles identified by an operational
theory, these in the ethical case being qualities (vir-
tues) supposedly possessing inherent merit. To take
Aristotle’s above-mentioned claim, one might con-
struct a scenario in which knowledge of a universal
was truly beyond a person’s capacity and therefore
ignorance of it should be blameless, or where
knowledge of a particular should have been obtain-
able had the actor behaved morally at earlier occa-
sions throughout life.
If, then, one suspects that a virtue theory is un-
sound on some point, one can do a more complete
analysis using the Principle of Goodness, This is
likely to be much easier than it would be for a utilit-
arian, as far-flung consequences, under the Principle,
cannot affect the evil of an act that is known to harm
the innocent here and now, whereas under utilitarian
theories, all kinds of remote consequences have to
be considered. ([Finnis])
Next we ask if a a virtue theory based on the
Principle accords with the requirement that it be lived
by human beings, restricted in someways by instinct-
ive human nature; that is, we allow evolutionary
psychology and other scientific fields to inform our
theory and refine it further. Evolutionary psychology
sees ethical behaviour as one amongmany outcomes
of evolutionary processes, positing, for example, that
just as fitness for reproduction selected for excellent
hearing in insectivorous bats, so too it selected for
feelings and loyalties that are commonly called
“ethical” in humans and perhaps other higher anim-
als. Evolutionary theories are inherently explanatory
rather than prescriptive ([Wright] Ch 16), in common
with the rest of the scientific enterprise. But when
such investigations show us, for example, that human
beings desire to excel, to possess social status, to see
their children prosper, we can take such findings into
account and find ways in which they can do so in
many different ways (arts, sciences, athletics, polit-
ics, business, and so on).
Commencing the Ethical Program
From evolutionary biology, one finding is pivotal:
adaptations are adaptive for individuals, not for
populations. (See [Williams].) And the Principle of
Goodness concerns individuals: a moral obligation
attaches to every individual and concerns every indi-
vidual. The Principle thus leads us to identify a major
moral mistake, which might as well have a name, so
we call it categorism. This is the lumping of individu-
als into categories and treating them, not as individu-
als, but as representatives of their category. By this
we do not mean the making of relevant distinctions.
The set of people who do not intend to pay for mer-
chandise is a category, but it is one to the members
of which a shopkeeper is entitled to deny the supply
of goods. However, categories such as a sex, a race,
a nation, and so on, are often or usually irrelevant to
moral concern. Tokenism, the filling of committees
and so on, with members of selected categories, is
profoundly futile once one remembers the huge di-
versity within categories, a diversity that has a deep,
scientifically established basis.
Note that we are not here trying to take ‘moral
lessons’ from science; rather, we are using science
to gain knowledge about ourselves and other organ-
isms. The ethical content comes from the Principle
of Goodness. Indeed, as many have observed, natural
processes contain a great deal that can be considered
evil, if viewedmorally. Nevertheless, including facts
about our nature in ethical theories must surely make
themmore effective. Beginning with the most funda-
mental results, that we are sentient beings, and our
pleasure/pain faculties evolved in making our ancest-
ors reproductively effective, proceeding to complex
and unexpected findings, we note that this has imme-
diate connection to the Principle of Goodness, as
these help provide content for the terms “benefit”
and “harm”.
The adoption of the Principle, even by a single
individual, has immediate consequences for all who
interact with them: they have nothing to fear from
those individuals, unless they themselves commence
hostilities of some sort. Indeed, the adopter of the
Principle will try to inculcate a feeling of beneficence
towards all, and will naturally attempt to understand
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the causes of others’ troubles. As [Smith] put it (Sect
I Chap II): “But whatever may be the cause of sym-
pathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases
us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling
with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we
ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the
contrary. ... How are the unfortunate relieved when
they have found out a person to whom they can
communicate the cause of their sorrow?” All aspects
of our investigation can now be seen to converge.
The Principle is a twin directive, one of universal
beneficence and one of non-harm. Onewho practices
these, or a society that practices them, must inculcate
a sense of safety and value in the recipient of this
concern.
Science provides a reality check. If we desire a
world of peace and friendship, flourishing, care,
compatibility with the environment and non-human
life, then we need to also be warned about the things
within our own natures that might interfere with our
program. The elephant in the room, the obvious
question about the Principle, arising from evolution-
ary considerations, is that the latter show why we
naturally have greater concern and tend to be more
altruistic towards those more closely related to us;
yet the Principle tells us to try to benefit everyone.
Can these be reconciled?
Firstly, we note that “everyone” includes ourselves
and our close relatives. We are not being asked to
be altruistic (at least, not in general, although, like
every other ethical theory, the Principle encounters
situations where altruism is called for). Secondly, it
is rational in ethical terms for us to be most con-
cerned about ourselves, less so about those close to
us (often our biological relations), and so on. This
is because we are usually in the best position to know
how to and be able to benefit ourselves, then our
closest, and so on decreasingly. Suppose someone
decides to starve in order to give everything they
have to the poor. Others who follow the Principle
must be concerned about this foolish but innocent
person, and will then feel obliged to divert effort
from their other beneficial projects in order to stop
the foolish one from dying of starvation. Such
pointless self-neglect causes loss for others. Being
most concerned for one’s self is not the same as be-
ing selfish. Onemight enter a business deal primarily
for reasons of personal advancement, and yet still
ensure that everyone else (partners, clients, custom-
ers, employees, the community, the environment)
also benefits. In evolutionary terms, all that is re-
quired for us to reproduce is that we effectively help
ourselves and our nearest and dearest. But caring for
others is an option open to us by virtue of our flexible
minds; so adopting an ethics that asks us to do so is
perfectly feasible, and in fact is not even onerous.
Despite the apparent altruism in being asked to try
to benefit everyone, the Principle is not in conflict
with human psychology.
Much more analysis needs to be done to firmly
establish this conclusion, but it must surely be clear
that explanatory theories do not inherently detract
from ethical philosophies that attempt to persuade
us of rules as to how we should act. On the contrary,
the latter are given an extra resource (the findings of
evolutionary investigations of behaviour) to use to
test ethical rules and practices. Evolutionary studies
of ethics buttress our assumption that realities in
patterns of cause and effect underlie moral language
and give meaning to words such as “good” and
“evil”, and that it is therefore quite reasonable to ask
(and not merely in a private sense) “What do these
words mean?” Although such patterns are perhaps
too complex to ever recognise in full, wemight hope
that careful statistical work within the evolutionary
psychology framework can show the existence of
some of them.
Where to from Here?
Wemay now proceed to develop the Principle accord-
ing to either a category (a) or (c) plan. The (a) plan
would develop ethical understanding afresh from the
Principle, and see where the effort leads us. Ethical
concepts such as virtues would be developed anew.
For example, Is honesty always the best policy?
Clearly not, because an honest action can quite
feasibly be part of a plan to harm someone; a person
uninterested in truth for anymoral reasonmight need
a fact to more effectively cause harm; honestly giving
them the recipe for an atomic bomb might be an at-
tempt to further such harm.We do not recognise that
virtues possess any inherent merit that isolates them
from moral scrutiny. Any value a virtue has is in
consequence of its use in avoiding harm or attempt-
ing benefit.
The other program would be to take existing cat-
egory (c) systems (such as Aristotelian, Confucian,
etc. philosophies) and re-examine them to see
whether they are justified in whole or part according
to the Principle of Goodness, and to see what addi-
tional guidance or improvement can be had by in-
forming the analysis at suitable points.
Whichever way one might proceed, the Principle
of Goodness is a realist theory, and reality sometimes
surprises or even disappoints us. Any of our cher-
ished beliefs or traditions might turn out to need
change or even abandonment. Reality is a hard
master, and its condition upon us all if we wish to
make progress in ethics is that we have that special
intellectual virtue, humility.
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